In this paper I examine some of the significant moral concerns inherent in cases of treatment refusal involving patients with psychotic disorders. In particular, I explore the relevance of the principle of autonomy in such situations. After exploring the concept of autonomy and explaining its current and historical significance in a health care setting, I argue that because autonomous choice depends for its existence upon certain human functions such as the ability to reason, judge, and assess consequences, patients cannot be (...) said to be making free and autonomous decisions if these capacities are compromised. I contend further that because psychotic disorders have the potential to compromise these functions in the future, it is appropriate, in some limited cases, to coerce patients with psychotic disorders to undergo treatment in order to preserve their future decision-making capacities and to protect their ability to recognize and respect the autonomy of others. (shrink)

In this paper I examine some of the significant moral concerns inherent in cases of treatment refusal involving patients with psychotic disorders. In particular, I explore the relevance of the principle of autonomy in such situations. After exploring the concept of autonomy and explaining its current and historical significance in a health care setting, I argue that because autonomous choice depends for its existence upon certain human functions such as the ability to reason, judge, and assess consequences, patients cannot be (...) said to be making free and autonomous decisions if these capacities are compromised. I contend further that because psychotic disorders have the potential to compromise these functions in the future, it is appropriate, in some limited cases, to coerce patients with psychotic disorders to undergo treatment in order to preserve their future decisionmaking capacities and to protect their ability to recognize and respect the autonomy of others. (shrink)

As the articles in this special issue have demonstrated, there are many compelling reasons for engaging in a specifically feminist examination of the body. First and foremost, such analysis is essential because the body and bodily concerns have historically been associated with women. The earliest of feminist critics noted philosophy’s tendency to reduce women to their bodily processes and to identify women with their bodies as opposed to with their reasoning capacities. Moreover, as a discipline, philosophy has traditionally rejected the (...) importance of embodiment—reason was seen to be central to philosophical investigation, while bodies and bodily processes were taken to be a distraction from rationality. Thus, the discipline simultaneously identified women with the body and condemned the body as an ignoble impediment to transcendence. (shrink)

At the simplest level, a feminist philosophical approach to the body would be one which takes a stand on issues that have historically been of concern to feminists, such as reproduction, sexual objectification, equality in sports, body image, eating disorders, sense of self, and autonomy, for example. The collection of essays that constitutes this journal issue begins with this approach. Authors present debates about these issues, and argue for what they perceive as a feminist perspective. For example, authors argue for (...) women's autonomy, rather than scientific control, over reproduction; for legal definitions of public decency that do not objectify women sexually; for single rather than double standards in athletics, and so on. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the ethics of care as a response to impartialist ethical theories. In section 1, I contrast Gilligan’s critique of impartial ethical theories with other objections to impartialism. In section 2, I analyze some of the ways in which impartialists have attempted to understand the ethics of care since the publication of Gilligan’s text. In section 3, I argue against proponents of impartialism and show that care constitutes an ethical theory in its own right, not one (...) which is dependent or parasitic upon impartialism. In section 4, I contrast care ethic’s conception of the self with that offered by traditional ethical theories, and argue that the most important distinction between the care and impartialist accounts of morality lies in the conception of the moral self which informs each of these approaches. (shrink)

In this paper I will move away from what has become the "traditional" approach to writing and thinking about philosophical counseling - I will not compare and contrast the virtues of the philosophical and psychological paradigms, nor will I attempt to defend philosophical counseling against its critics. Instead, I will use the methods and practices employed by philosophical counselors as a paradigm to inform and govern another philosophical practice, that is, clinical medical ethics. I will show that clinical ethics and (...) philosophical counseling share many common attributes, and argue that each discipline has much to offer to the other. (shrink)

At the simplest level, a feminist philosophical approach to the body would be one which takes a stand on issues that have historically been of concern to feminists, such as reproduction, sexual objectification, equality in sports, body image, eating disorders, sense of self, and autonomy, for example. The collection of essays that constitutes this journal issue begins with this approach. Authors present debates about these issues, and argue for what they perceive as a feminist perspective. For example, authors argue for (...) women's autonomy, rather than scientific control, over reproduction; for legal definitions of public decency that do not objectify women sexually; for single rather than double standards in athletics, and so on. (shrink)